05.08.2017

RÆSON: Could you give a brief account of the developments in the Yemeni civil war?

In early 2012, Yemen’s President Abdullah Saleh was ousted in Yemen’s Arab Spring. During the transitional government that followed, 2012-2014, the Houthi organization transformed itself from a regional opposition group into a contender for national leadership. They made an alliance with the former president, who wanted to reinsert himself into power. At first, the Houthi political leadership tried to consolidate a strong position within the existing Yemeni government, now with Hadi as president.

When they went into Sana’a in September 2014, they made a very smart political move: they insisted upon a new government that was not of their own members but rather a technocratic government. Their technocratic government was popular amongst all Yemenis. In the new government, Hadi was still president, but the ministers were all new and well-respected. At that point, the Houthis seemed to be doing very well, but they destroyed their new legitimacy with their continued military push towards al-Hudayda in the west and Taiz and Aden in the south.

When [the houthis] went in to Sana’a in September 2014, they made a smart political choice: They insisted on a new government, which did not consist of their own members but rather technocrats
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RÆSON: Why did they do that?

I suspect that former President Saleh had a role in it. He needed to destroy the transitional process entirely because the process excluded him. Thus, Saleh may have been helping the Houthis overplay their hand, or the Houthis were just overambitious.

Next, in January 2016, the Houthis overthrew the very government they had installed. They put President Hadi and his government under house arrest and declared that they were going to rule by means of a revolutionary council. Effectively, they had carried out a coup, which was a very dumb thing to do because their technocratic government was popular and the coup destroyed their legitimacy inside and outside the country. It opened a door for intervention by outside actors like Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

In January 2016 the houthis overthrew the very government they had installed
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Traditionally, the Saudis have dominated Yemen, and they would like to maintain their dominance. They are not too upset that the Houthis are supported by the Iranians. The real problem is that the Houthis are an independent power that does not respond to Riyadh. Essentially, what the Houthis have done is to rearrange the constellation of power in the north of Yemen, particularly in the powerful Hashid tribal confederation, thereby removing one of the pillars of Saudi influence in the country.

It also has to do with domestic Saudi politics. The new king and his son – and the son’s ambitions. I think they wanted to make Yemen a test case, a new kind of advanced forward military policy. They had never used their military in this way before.

[Saudi Arabia] wanted to make Yemen a test case, a new kind of advanced forward military policy. They had never used their military in this way before
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RÆSON: Would you ascribe these changes to the new ambitious crown prince, Mohammad Bin Salman?

Yes, he is the commander of those forces. And he is the head of the ministry overseeing the restructuring of the Saudi economy. In other words, he both commands the military and the economy.

Once the bombing started the Saudi coalition immediately established complete air dominance. The coalition also imposed an air and sea blockade of the country to prevent external support for the Houthis and Saleh. Yemen was surrounded, and I think the Saudis thought that the Houthis would give up. But they didn’t. In fact, many militaries have tried to conquer Yemen and failed. The Egyptians tried in the 1960’s and failed. It was the Vietnam of Egypt. This time, the Egyptians wisely kept out while publicly supporting the Saudi coalition.

So, it was the Saudis and the Emiratis that intervened, visibly with a division of labor. The Saudis run the air campaign and support the army of Ali Muhsin in Marib in the eastern desert and the government of Hadi in Riyadh, while the Emirates run security and the ground campaigns in southern Yemen.

The immediate objective was to liberate Aden, which the Emirates achieved by backing southern resistance forces in the summer of 2015. The Emirates then created domestic security forces in Aden, Lahij, Hadramaut, Shabwah and Abyan, made up of locals, but run by the Emirates. As soon as the military campaign began in March 2015, al-Qaeda took control of the coast of the Hadhramawt including the key port of Mukulla. At first, the Saudi coalition disregarded the threat from al-Qaeda saying that when the legitimate government of Hadi was reestablished in Sanaa, al-Qaeda would be addressed. By the summer of 2016, the coalition realized that the war was not going to end soon and that al-Qaeda was a real threat to the coalition. The Emirates invaded Mukulla and pushed al-Qaeda into the central regions of Yemen in early summer 2016.

Despite these developments, the Saudi-Emirati coalition’s progress has been limited. They control a large amount of Yemen, but it is mostly desert. The main population centers – located in the western highlands – are under Houthi control. Basically, except for the south, the battle lines are where they were two years ago. The Emirati backed forces made some progress on the southwestern coast at Mokha and recently took the strategic Khalid military base in Taiz Governorate, but at this point in the war, I don’t think anybody has great interest in attempting to change the situation. For the Houthis, the continuance of the war is good propaganda. They talk about foreign aggression, and it works. Of course, the Saudis would like a victory, but they have already shown their ability to use force and are keeping the Houthis busy.

the Saudi-Emirati coalition’s progress has been limited. They control a large amount of Yemen, but it is mostly desert. The main population centers – located in the western highlands – are under Houthi control
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RÆSON: What about the role of the Iranians?

That is obviously an issue. It is one of the main reasons for the intervention given by the Saudis. The Houthi leadership has been in Iran. Houthi fighters have been trained by Hezbollah or by Iraqi forces. Houthi may have gotten some advanced weapons, rockets in particular, from Iran.

But remember that the Houthis are blockaded. Everything must be smuggled in and must get past the British, American, and Saudi forces. So, it is not a lot of support. The advantage of the Houthis is that they are in the mountains, and they know the mountains well. You would need a ground force to get them out, and the ground forces backed by the Saudis and Emirates have yet to show any ability to push the Houthi back in the mountains.

RÆSON: What is the Saudi long-term strategy in Yemen?

There is no long-term strategy. That is the problem. And they are kind of stuck now. Likely, they will continue bombing and support their Yemeni forces in the country – a sort of low-level warfare – for some time until something shifts. The Saudi economy is also challenged. The war costs a lot, but they are willing to keep paying for it because it demonstrates that they are aggressively fighting the Iranians. So, they continue bombing and supporting Yemeni forces even though they haven’t made much progress towards a military victory.

There is no long-term strategy. That is the problem. And they are kind of stuck now
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In Yemen, the economy is geared towards supporting the war. On both sides, there are people making a lot of money on the war, smuggling arms, oil and food supplies. Sometimes, they are even selling to each other across the battle lines. Right now, in Yemen, the only people being paid are soldiers; no one else is being paid. Therefore, the soldiers have an incentive to keep the war going.

RÆSON: What about the United States? Do the Americans have a strategy in Yemen?

The Americans are primarily interested in al-Qaeda. The Houthis are enemies of al-Qaeda, and they have been effective in pushing al-Qaeda out of some of their strongholds in Yemen.

In the final months of the Obama administration, after Trump had become president-elect, Secretary of State John Kerry pushed hard for a settlement between the parties. However, Kerry’s proposals would have marginalized Hadi, so the Hadi government stalled until Trump was inaugurated.

Trump is very supportive of Saudi Arabia, but Trump allows Secretary of Defense Mattis and Pentagon to do as they please. Their priority is al-Qaeda, but Mattis also holds the traditional US view that Iran is the primary source of trouble in the region and Saudi Arabia is the US’s primary ally. Mattis served in Yemen previously, and he shares the Saudi view that Iran should have no role in Yemen. At the same time, the US wants to stabilize Yemen because instability serves al-Qaeda, so the US is more inclined towards a political settlement.

Trump is very supportive of Saudi Arabia, but Trump allows Secretary of Defense Mattis and Pentagon to do as they please. Their priority is al-Qaeda
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RÆSON: In Europe, we do not hear much about the situation in Yemen. The international community seems completely silent on the issue?

Yes. It is partly because, at the moment, there seems to be no political solution in sight. Hence, the international community has limited power, particularly because the main player is Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis have a free pass from Trump. In fact, Obama also gave the Saudis a bit of a pass, perhaps to compensate for the fact that he had negotiated the nuclear deal with Iran.

RÆSON: Nonetheless, the United Nations recently blamed the Saudi coalition for carrying out a deadly airstrike on civilians, reportedly with no military targets in sight. And it is not the first time. Is it in any way possible to bring about an end to the conflict with the backing of a consistent, hard-lined international community?

No. Under the Trump administration, the United States strongly backs Saudi Arabia and sees Iran as an enemy. Thus, they are going to back the Saudis in most anything they do.

RÆSON: With regards to the current Qatar crisis, Rex Tillerson and James Mattis have both put distance between themselves and Trump’s tweets. Is it completely inconceivable that something similar and more productive could provide a way forward in the Yemeni case?

Well, people are not really paying attention to Yemen. Some resolutions to stop the arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been put forward in the US congress, but I do not think it is really going to happen. Yemen is not considered important. In Europe, Syrian and Iraqi refugees are causing a crisis but there are very few Yemeni refugees in Europe because Yemenis cannot get out.

RÆSON: Oxfam estimates that 360.000 people have gotten cholera since the outbreak in April this year. It appears that Yemen is not only a trap, it is a death trap. What are your thoughts on this?

The economy has collapsed. Oil provided about a third of Yemen’s GDP before, and it accounted for 70-80% of government spending. However, when the war broke out, oil exports stopped completely. GDP went from 43 billion US dollars to 27 billion US dollars. That is a dramatic decrease. Government salaries are not being paid at all, and consequently, demand has collapsed inside the economy. People simply do not have any money. There are goods to buy. Things are getting in. I talked to an Oxfam policy maker today, and in the markets, there is food. But people do not have any money to buy it. Some are already on extended credit with local merchants. Some are selling the furniture in their houses. That is the problem; the economy has collapsed entirely.

As a consequence, the government is not functioning at all. Health services are not functioning. The garbage is not being collected. The sewer system is broken. Of course, these are the causes of the cholera outbreak. Cholera is treatable, but people do not have money to pay for transportation to get to the hospital. If they somehow get there anyway, the necessary medical supplies are not there.

The economy has collapsed entirely. As a consequence, the government is not functioning at all. Health services are not functioning. The garbage is not being collected. The sewer system is broken. Of course, these are the causes of the cholera outbreak
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Recently, it seems that it has come a little bit under control. The numbers are no longer increasing. Yet, even if it may be getting better right now, it is just the first crisis. There is going to be another one unless a political settlement ends the war.

RÆSON: Supposedly, these crises will continue until the larger conflict in Yemen is resolved. What would it take to reach a peaceful resolution?

In complex conflicts like this, there is no military solution. The solution has to be a political one. Realistically, international negotiations need to happen first, probably between the Houthis and the Saudis. After that, there needs to be a Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue about a national unity government in which the Houthis are going to play a major role. I believe there is room for such a dialogue. We are just not there yet.

RÆSON: I briefly touched on the Qatari crisis before, and obviously, it is another major conflict line in Saudi foreign policy. What are your thoughts on this?

It is ridiculous. It is mostly about the Saudis wanting to dominate Qatar. Qatar is a very small, but very wealthy country. What distinguishes the Qataris is their pursuit of an independent foreign policy. They like to be the mediator between powers. That is the reason for their relationship with Iran. On their part, the Saudis would like to crush Qatar and make it part of Saudi Arabia.

RÆSON: Make them an actual part of Saudi Arabia or part of a Saudi sphere of influence?

They do not want Qatar to have an independent foreign policy. Officially, they accuse Qatar of assisting terrorists, but from a Saudi perspective, the real offense is the independent foreign policy, the contacts with Iran and the support of the Muslim Brotherhood.

RÆSON: But these are issues that have been around for many years?

Yes, it is an old conflict. But it reappears at a very bad time because it complicates everything that is going on in Yemen. The Hadi government, supported by the Saudis, is simultaneously supported by the Islah party in Yemen, which is the local Muslim Brotherhood, and by Qatar. The Emirates, who are supposed to help Hadi in the south, are very anti-Muslim Brotherhood. It is absolutely ridiculous.

The Hadi government, supported by the Saudis, is simultaneously supported by the Islah party in Yemen, which is the local Muslim Brotherhood, and by Qatar. The Emirates, who are supposed to help Hadi in the south, are very anti-Muslim Brotherhood. It is absolutely ridiculous
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RÆSON: Anwar Gargash, the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates, posted a tweet on 22 July: There would be no talk until Qatar revised its policies. Together with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, they listed their demands, including closing down Al-Jazeera completely.

Yes, the media on both sides have become pure propaganda. The interesting thing is that Yemeni media has split as well. Some are supporting the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, some are supporting Qatar. They make up bad stories about each other.

But it will stop. There will be a different crisis, and then, they are going to forget about this one. That is what happened in the past. There may be some very small changes, but basically, nothing is going to change. Tillerson visited Qatar and said that there should be a negotiated settlement. The Americans made a major military deal too, during the crisis that is. 

RÆSON: But that had already been in the pipeline for some years?

But they did not stop it. The American military establishment knows that a united Gulf is a very important part of their foreign policy. They do not want trouble.

RÆSON: You mentioned it yourself, and I previously interviewed senior researcher Helle Malmvig on this, who claimed that Qatar wants room for maneuvering. Is that possible with the degree of severity of the demands from the Saudis, the Emirates, and Egypt?

They might have to temper a little bit. For example, they might have to cut their relationships with Iran. And they might have to show that they are not supporting any al-Qaeda groups in Syria.

 
RÆSON: How do they show that?

They may have to make some moves to prove it. The interesting thing is that Oman plays the same role – in fact, even more so. The Omanis have very good relations with the Iranians, and they have played a mediating role in Yemen. Yet, the Omanis were never attacked like the Qataris were because they are not as strong. They do not represent a threat. Nevertheless, basically, they do the same thing.

RÆSON: Helle Malmvig also emphasized the timing of the Qatari-GCC crisis. In my understanding, to a great extent, Muhammad Bin Salman in Saudi Arabia is orchestrating it all. Do you think the crisis has been orchestrated because Muhammad Bin Salman assumed the unequivocal backing of Trump after the visit in May?

That certainly could play a role. In this sense, Trump was not very smart.

RÆSON: Is that why he leaves it to Tillerson, Mattis, and everyone else?

Yes. He delegates. He told Mattis to do whatever he wants. Still, the timing is strange to me. But I see it through the lens of Yemen and may not have an accurate view of it.

Nonetheless, the timing could not be worse. It split the coalition against the Houthis, and that was a big setback. There was fighting in Aden over this. President Hadi fired his governors because of the turmoil in the south over the Qatari/Saudi/Emirati issue. To me, it seems like a disaster in terms of a Yemen strategy.

[The Qatar crisis] is a disaster in terms of a Yemen strategy
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Dr. Charles Schmitz is professor of Geography at Towson University in Baltimore, USA. He is a specialist in the Middle East and Yemen and Vice President of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies and board member in the Council of American Overseas Research Centers. His research areas include the development of Yemen’s political economy, international law and counter terrorism policy. ILLUSTRATION: People gather and inspect rubbles after a Saudi-led airstrike in the capitol of Yemen, Sana’a, 9 June 2017 [photo: Hani Mohammed/AP Photo/Polfoto]